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aThe Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is an agree-ment currently being negotiated to establish a free tradearea among all the nations of the Americas except Cuba.
The Third Summit of the Americas, the most recent round of
FTAA negotiations, was held on April 20–22, 2001, in Quebec
City, Canada. The current focus of the agreement is on trade
liberalization—removing restrictions on the free movement of
capital, goods, and services— in the hemisphere. While the
FTAA could be a means of stimulating economic growth and
cooperation, the growth should also result in a lessening of
income inequality and not an increase in economic disparity,
as has occurred under the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). Currently, the FTAA negotiators are looking at
NAFTA as a model for the FTAA.
Although NAFTA may be an effective
model for promoting corporate
interests, the agreement has failed as
a means to strengthen and enforce
workers’ rights in North America. 
NAFTA has encouraged the
increase in the number of export pro-
cessing plants (maquiladoras) in Mex-
ico. Many of these maquiladoras have
come under attack for being sweat-
shops. Sweatshops are workplaces with
exploitative conditions, including haz-
ardous working conditions, lack of a living wage, denial of basic
benefits, and intimidation and violence directed towards work-
ers advocating for independent unions. Stronger labor protections
need to be built into the FTAA to ensure that free trade does not
result in an increase of sweatshops throughout the Americas. Thus
far in the FTAA negotiating process, labor organizations and
other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have not been
able to raise these issues in a meaningful way. Shutting out these
organizations has led to a narrow, corporate-driven agenda for
the FTAA without an exploration of alternative development
models that promote equitable economic growth. 
Background
The FTAA grew out of the First Summit of the Americas
(Miami Summit), which took place in December 1994. The
Miami Summit was a dialogue between the 34 nations of the
Organization of American States. At the Miami Summit, the
participating nations developed a Declaration of Principles,
and committed to an overall plan of action. These principles
included the following concepts: preserving and strengthening
the democracies of the Americas; promoting prosperity through
economic integration and free trade; eradicating poverty; and
guaranteeing sustainable development and the conservation of
the natural environment. Further, the participating nations
committed to developing a free trade area encompassing all 34
nations. The formal negotiations for the FTAA began at the
Second Summit of the Americas (Santiago Summit) in April
1998, and focused on trade liberalization. 
At the Santiago Summit, nine working groups were estab-
lished to deal with each of the major areas of negotiation,
including agriculture, market access, services, investment, intel-
lectual property, and anti-dumping/countervailing duties.
These nine working groups included government representa-
tives from the participating nations. Currently, over 500 cor-
porate representatives have security clearances to directly
participate in the negotiating process. 
In following the working group model, NGOs advocated
for working groups to be established on the environment,
labor, and human rights. To date, these proposed working
groups have not been created. Instead of the establishment of
a working group for labor, at the March 1998 San Jose minis-
terial meeting in Costa Rica a Committee on Civil Society was
developed to function as a non-negotiating intergovernmental
committee to respond to the concerns of non-business groups,
including NGOs. NGO representatives, however, are limited to
submitting written submissions to the Committee on Civil Soci-
ety. Moreover, the Committee’s role is simply to compile this
information, summarize the comments, and report this infor-
mation to the trade ministers of the negotiating countries with-
out any formal discussion mecha-
nism with the working groups. NGO
efforts to participate are also being
severely hampered by lack of access
to the actual drafts of the FTAA
negotiating documents. 
For example, in the United
States, the Office of the United
States Representative has refused
repeated requests under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) for
access to the position documents
submitted by the United States to
other nations during the FTAA negotiations. On March 7,
2001, the Center for International Environmental Law, a U.S.
NGO, brought suit to compel the release of these public doc-
uments and to declare the withholding of these documents
unlawful under FOIA. Without access to such documents and
with the ongoing secrecy of the proceedings, there cannot be
meaningful participation in the development of a free trade
agreement that incorporates human rights. 
The Debate over Free Trade and Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) estab-
lished a set of standards of achievement for all nations of the world.
The UDHR states that “[e]veryone is entitled to a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration can be fully realized” (Article 28). Countries must
craft any free trade agreements in congruence with their oblig-
ations under the UDHR. While countries may argue that this
debate is about trade and not human rights, these agreements
extend beyond commercial concerns and have a direct impact on
national political processes and individual rights. 
Opponents of free trade agreements like NAFTA and the
FTAA, such as the U.S.-based NGO Public Citizen and the
Council of the Canadians, argue that free trade can create a race
to the bottom. Free trade facilitates the movement of corpora-
tions from high-wage countries to low-wage countries. In
response to this trend, governments of target nations are then
pressured to lower or maintain low labor standards to attract and
keep foreign direct investment. This pressure depresses wages
far below the “just and favourable remuneration” required
under Article 23(2) of the UDHR. It also creates incentives for
governments and corporations to either bust unions or other-
wise prevent workers from advocating for wage increases and
improved conditions in violation of the right to form and to join
trade unions under Article 23(4) and the ILO core workers’
rights standards. 
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This trend is not limited to developing nations. According
to Cassie Watters, an organizer for Massachusetts Jobs with Jus-
tice in the United States: “[f]ree trade has become another cud-
gel to use against unions and underpaid workers in this coun-
try [the United States] by threatening to move operations—and
take away people’s jobs—to places where they pay even less.” Free
trade enables and encourages multinational companies to move
their operations from nations with strong labor protections to
nations with weaker labor protections. This race to the bottom
is directly counter to the goals of the UDHR. Article 25 speci-
fies that “everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate
for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and nec-
essary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or
other lack of livelihood in circum-
stances beyond his control.”  The
rights protected by the UDHR can-
not be achieved in isolation from
agreements such as the FTAA, which
deals with the economic decision-
making and development of nations.
Free trade agreements that encour-
age nations to attract foreign direct
investment by keeping wages low and
restricting workers’ rights to organize are in direct opposition
to Articles 28, 23, and 25 of the UDHR. 
These rights are further reinforced in the conventions of the
International Labor Organization (ILO)—a UN specialized
agency founded in 1946. The ILO promotes labor and human
rights through the work of a unique tripartite structure with
workers, employers, and governments. In the June 1998 Dec-
laration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the
ILO declared that all Members of the ILO had endorsed the fol-
lowing core workers’ rights and have a duty “to respect, to pro-
mote and to realize” these rights: freedom of association, right
to collective bargaining, elimination of forced labor, elimina-
tion of child labor, and elimination of discrimination in respect
to employment and occupation. As negotiators develop the
FTAA, these rights must be incorporated to ensure the fin-
ished agreement does not result in their systematic violation.
NAFTA—A Model in Failure for Workers’ Rights?
FTAA negotiators have looked to NAFTA as their model.
NAFTA, which came into effect in January 1994, is a free trade
agreement between Canada, Mexico, and the United States
based on the free market principles of national treatment,
most favored nation treatment, and transparency of govern-
mental processes. Free trade advocates promoted NAFTA as an
agreement that would lead to increased prosperity for all three
nations. According to Public Citizen, however, since NAFTA was
first implemented, an estimated 395,000 jobs have transferred
from U.S. workers to Mexican workers, who earn 77 percent less.
The economic growth in Mexico has been mainly limited to the
industrial northern border region where over one million Mex-
icans work in maquiladoras for less than the Mexican minimum
wage, which is approximately U.S.$3.40 per hour. 
Human Rights and Labor Sidelined
During the development of NAFTA, the negotiators incor-
porated workers’ rights and environmental protection (which
was the first time these issues had been incorporated in a free
trade agreement) into two side agreements— the North Amer-
ican Agreement of Labor Cooperation (NAALC) and the North
American Agreement of Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).
The labor agreement was a significant development for sev-
eral reasons: 1) NAALC creates a private right of action for work-
ers, their representatives, and/or other affected individuals
rather than only permitting State Parties to bring claims for vio-
lations of the side agreement; 2) the NAALC dispute resolution
process is a transparent procedure with public access; and 3) the
NAALC recognizes core workers’ rights. With all of these strong
elements, however, the labor agreement remains ineffective
because the dispute resolution process does not provide enforce-
able remedies.
The Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organize Convention of 1948 (ILO Convention 87) guarantees
the rights of free association and collective bargaining. Even
though Mexico signed ILO Convention 87, during the NAFTA
negotiations Mexico refused to allow the inclusion of a provi-
sion that would sanction parties to NAFTA for persistent viola-
tions of core workers’ rights. Instead,
the NAALC requires each State
Party to establish a national admin-
istrative office that would file public
reports about labor issues and can
recommend ministerial consulta-
tion. But consultation is voluntary,
with no binding sanctions if the
party, or particular companies, con-
tinue to violate provisions of the
labor or environmental protection agreements. This voluntary
process, while useful in documenting abuses, does not result in
mandatory action in response to the findings of persistent vio-
lations of core workers’ rights. Aggrieved workers at maquilado-
ras who have brought claims through the NAALC based on
violations of their ILO rights have not received redress. More-
over, they have faced intimidation and violence in response to
their filing a claim. 
This lack of enforceability is in stark contrast to the binding
dispute resolution mechanism for the enforcement of investors’
rights in the main text of NAFTA Chapter 11. Under this
process, private investors can bring arbitration claims against
State Parties for violations of the NAFTA investment provi-
sions. In the past seven years, investors successfully challenged
governmental regulation that companies argued violate NAF-
TA’s investor protections. These challenges resulted in million
dollar settlements. Meanwhile, workers’ and community com-
plaints filed under the NAFTA side agreements do not provide
any enforceable remedy. 
Learning From NAFTA’s Weaknesses—the U.S.-Jordan Free
Trade Agreement
The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (U.S.-Jordan Agree-
ment), while not a comprehensive alternative, is an important
attempt to address some of the weaknesses in the NAFTA
model. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the U.S.-
Jordan Agreement on October 24, 2000, and it is currently
pending Senate ratification. The most significant elements of
the treaty are that environmental and labor agreements are part
of the main text as distinct articles rather than relegated to side
agreements. Additionally, the agreement reaffirmed both coun-
tries’ commitments to the ILO’s core labor standards. While the
amount of trade between the two nations is significantly less than
that between the NAFTA nations, the U.S.-Jordan Agreement
creates a useful starting point for the development of the FTAA.
According to former U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky, “[t]he agreement is also the first to ever have, in the
. . . workers’ and community complaints
filed under the NAFTA side agreements do
not provide any enforceable remedy.
FTAA, continued from previous page
continued on next page 
2
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [2001], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol8/iss3/10
28
body of a U.S. trade agreement itself, key provisions that recon-
firm that free trade and the protection of the environment and
of the rights of workers go hand-in-hand. It will not require
either country to adopt new laws, but rather requires each to
enforce the laws it currently has, which will join free trade and
open markets with other public responsibilities.” The U.S.-
Jordan Agreement moves beyond NAFTA by incorporating labor
issues into the main text of the free trade agreement and utilizes
the same dispute resolution and enforcement mechanism for
labor disputes as is used for the agreement’s commercial terms. 
Although it is significant that investment disputes are not priv-
ileged over labor disputes, the U.S.-Jordan Agreement nonethe-
less has significant weaknesses. Most strikingly, the Agreement
does not permit private parties to challenge violations of the
labor provisions. Rather, it forces them to rely on State Parties
to challenge such violations. Lastly, the Agreement does not cre-
ate explicit sanctions for violations of the labor provisions.
Improving the FTAA
Theoretically, the NAFTA labor side agreement creates a use-
ful model by providing a private right of action and a transparent
procedure. In practice, however, the lack of an enforceable rem-
edy means that the NAALC is ineffective in protecting workers’
rights. The U.S.-Jordan Agreement, while a step forward in ele-
vating labor concerns to the same level as commercial con-
cerns, does not go far enough in developing enforceable labor
protections and limits access to the dispute resolution mecha-
nism to the State Parties themselves. An effective model for the
FTAA would draw on strengths of these previous free trade
agreements and leave behind the weaknesses of non-enforce-
ability. These agreements, however, are not the only possible
models for the FTAA. 
The International Labor Rights Fund has summarized the var-
ious proposals by numerous NGO’s on how to effectively incor-
porate labor rights into free trade agreements. These propos-
als move beyond the requirements under NAFTA and the
U.S.-Jordan Agreement that nations simply enforce their own
laws. The following principles are outlined in the proposals: com-
pliance with a social clause outlining workers’ rights as a con-
dition to participate in the trade agreement; participation in a
process to harmonize labor laws upward with each nation agree-
ing to enforce its own laws as a starting point; a requirement that
multinational companies operating within the free trade area
comply with the terms of the social clause; and enforcement pro-
visions for violations of the social clause by a member country
and/or a company operating within a member country. These
remedies could take the form of labor sanctions or monetary
penalties. These proposals would mean that not only are the ILO
core workers’ rights respected but that nations would work
toward securing the broader economic rights advocated by the
UDHR, such as the living wage.
The Need for Meaningful Participation
This basic set of principles is just the start of developing a
workable proposal for how to effectively address human rights
and labor concerns. These improvements should come from a
more transparent process with a genuine incorporation of a
broader spectrum of interests than simply corporate interests.
These suggestions should not be compiled by the Civil Society
Committee and ignored, but must be integrated into the actual
negotiations. The public must have access to the negotiating doc-
uments in order to have a useful role in the integration of
labor protections into the FTAA. If there is not meaningful par-
ticipation in the development of the FTAA, the public must at
least have a meaningful say in whether their nation should join
or reject the FTAA. 
Conclusion
At the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec, the nego-
tiators must take heed and listen to the thousands of protestors
who gathered outside of the event advocating for greater pub-
lic participation in the FTAA negotiating process and a more
significant focus on equity concerns. Only through a more
open and transparent process will it be possible to develop
alternative models for the FTAA, models that help foster rather
than degrade the protection of human rights. While the FTAA
negotiations are focused on increasing economic prosperity
through free trade, the focus of these negotiations should not
be in isolation from the other enumerated goals of the Miami
Summit, which include the eradication of poverty. Economic
prosperity cannot be achieved simply through opening markets,
but must be accompanied by appropriate government involve-
ment to ensure that greater equity comes with greater prosperity.
One important way of achieving this goal is by incorporating
meaningful mechanisms into the FTAA to ensure that core
workers’ rights are recognized and enforced. 
*Sheryl Dickey is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and an articles editor for the Human Rights Brief. 
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shouldering. The gacaca plan, however, is not the only possibility
for improvement. Its conception of unchecked popular participa-
tion in the prosecution and judging of defendants jeopardizes key
guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality, and its denial
of the assistance of counsel and other procedural rights compro-
mises human rights protections at the heart of a fair trial.
Furthermore, the gacaca plan may not meet its own stated
goals. The increase in popular participation may not correspond
to an increase in perceived legitimacy of process because the new
plan does not resemble the traditional gacaca practice in critical
ways. Some observers also doubt the gacaca system would provide
the promised increased rate of adjudications: the selection and
training of so many lay judges poses enormous logistical chal-
lenges, and the proposal has already been delayed over one year
beyond its original starting date. According to Amnesty Inter-
national’s April 2000 report, the gacaca plan’s notion of forced
testimony in highly public proceedings also increases the risk of
false testimony. These shortcomings are all the more serious
given the current acquittal rate of 20 percent in ordinary trials. 
In order to avoid trading one system for a more harmful one,
Rwanda should take steps to safeguard the independence and
impartiality of the gacaca plan, allow for access to counsel and for
a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense, and provide
the possibility for review before an ordinary court. 
*Leah Werchick is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of Law.
She worked with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights in Rwanda from 1996 to 1998.
Rwanda, continued from page 17
3
Dickey: The Free Trade Area of the Americas and Human Rights Concerns
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2001
